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GOVERNANCE MECHNISMS IN IS OUTSOURCING PROJECTS 
IN TRANSITION ECONMIES 
Abstract 
Previous IS outsourcing research studies failed to provide evidences on how IT client-vendor 
relationships should be governed to ensure project success and relational continuity. More 
importantly, it is even challenging for companies to achieve outsourcing success in transition 
economies facing an environment characterized by institutional instability. This article draws from 
theories of institutions and organizations to develop a model examining outsourcing relationship 
governance mechanisms which would affect outsourcing success in state-owned and non-state-owned 
Chinese companies. Results of 72 state-owned and 54 non-state-owned outsourcing projects show that 
the positive relationship between contractual governance and outsourcing success is stronger in state-
owned firms than in non-state-owned firms. On the other hand, non-state-owned firms have stronger 
effects on the relationships between relational governance and outsourcing success, and between 
outsourcing success and relational continuity.  
 
Keywords: Governance Mechanisms, Transition Economies, Institutional Context, Outsourcing 
Success, Relational Continuity.  
 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
With the development of information systems (IS) outsourcing, the domain of the client-vendor 
relationship receives much attention recently. A number of researchers have listed the client-vendor 
relationship as a key element of successful IS outsourcing (e.g., Grover and Cheon and Teng 1996, 
Klepper 1995). Given the importance of relationship governance on outsourcing vendors, literature 
reveals the relationship can be viewed as a contractual transaction (Wang 2002) or as a long-term 
partnership emphasizing trust and mutual benefits (e.g., Lee and Kim 1999). These two perspectives of 
mechanisms, namely contractual governance and relational governance, are mostly examined 
governing mechanisms of interfirm relationships (e.g., Heide 1994, Popper and Zenger 2002).  
Researchers have found that organizations simultaneously operate distinct governance mechanisms for 
the same function (Bradach and Eccles 1989). Prior literatures identified direct relationship or 
combined relationship between contractual/relational governance and its outcomes, such as 
opportunism (e.g., Cavusgil and Deligonul and Zhang 2004), or exchange performance (e.g., Ferguson 
and Paulin and Bergeron 2005). However, the relative effectiveness of contractual and relational 
mechanisms in enhancing outsourcing success and ensuring future relationship has yet to be addressed.  
Furthermore, institutional frameworks suggest that any analyses of firm behaviour, must take into 
account of the nature of the institutional framework (Peng and Heath 1996). However, little previous 
studies touch on the institutional issues which may have crucial influence on the relationship 
governance mechanisms. Previous literature in this area are mainly limited to outsourcing projects in 
Western developed markets with relatively stable institutional environments. Yet little is known about 
how the decisions of governance mechanisms are related to outsourcing success in transition 
economies that are experiencing significant institutional changes in moving from central planning to 
market competition (Li and Zhang 2007). 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to advance the understanding of the consequences of contractual 
and relational governance mechanisms in China’s transition economy.  
2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
2.1 Governance mechanisms and their consequences 
We refer governance mechanisms in the outsourcing relationships to the process and rules governing 
actions by the outsourcer firm in a manner that promotes desirable outsourcee behaviours (e.g., 
Choudlhury and Sabherwal 2003). Among research investigating the interfirm relationships, two 
mechanisms are most often examined: contractual and relational governance (Sobrero and Schrader 
1998). Contractual governance emphasizes the use of formalized, equally-binding agreement, or a 
contract to govern the interfirm partnership. On the other hand, relational governance is an 
endogenous mechanism that can enhance exchange performance by embedding private and public 
information flows in a matrix of social ties rather than by resorting to contract or its enforcement by a 
third party (Uzzi 1999). 
The two outcome variables examined are outsourcing success and relational continuity expectation. 
Outsourcing success refers to the overall organizational advantage obtained from IS outsourcing. 
Previous studies assess outsourcing success in terms of attainment of strategic, economic, and 
technological benefits (e.g., Grover et al. 1996). While relational continuity expectation is defined as 
the exchange parties’ perspective of the long-term viability of the relationship (Jap and Anderson 
2003). When the participant parties expect that the relationship will continue into the future, they will 
engage in processes and make investments to enhance the relationship into the long run (e.g., Jap and 
Anderson 2003). 
  
Prior literatures identified direct relationship or combined relationship between contractual/relational 
governance and its outcomes. Researchers argue that well-specified contracts may structure 
expectations and obligations, reduce future risk and uncertainty (Cannon and Achrol and Gundlach 
2000), and provide legal protections to both parties (Cannon and Perreault 1999). Furthermore, formal 
contracts can serve as a foundation for the successful relationship and promote cooperative, long-term, 
trusting exchange relationship (e.g., Ferguson et al. 2005). 
Previous studies found relational governance is positively associated with exchange performance (Artz 
1999). The benefits of relational governance include shared goals, and other social patterns (Black 
1998), mitigation of opportunistic behavior (Achrol and Gundlach 1999), net reduction of transaction 
cost (Artz 1999), improved information and service exchange (Vasylchenko 2005). On the other hand, 
Heide and Miner (1992) highlighted the close relationship between expectations of future interaction 
and cooperative behaviour. If the parties do not perceive that they will receive worthwhile benefits 
from the relationship, they are likely to quit. Therefore the collaborative relationship, based on trust 
and long-term commitment, could enhance the relational continuity expectation.  
In sum, we believe that both governance mechanisms will have a positive relationship with 
outsourcing success and relational continuity. However, since above relationships are not the main 
focus of this study, we will not hypothesize on these relationships. 
2.2 Outsourcing Success and Relational Continuity Expectation  
We also expect that there will be a positive relationship between the outsourcing success and future 
relational continuity. Ring and Van de Ven (1994) proposed that a decision to continue an 
interorganizational relationship is based on an assessment of economic efficiency and fairness of past 
transactions. They proposed that if the commitments of exchanging parties are executed in an efficient 
and equitable manner, they will continue with or expand their mutual commitments. Fornell (1994) 
found that companies are highly dependent on customer satisfaction for repeated business in those 
industries where switching barriers are less powerful. Accordingly, literature stressed the importance 
of current project success, which can be an important determinant of decisions of future collaboration. 
Again, since the relationship is not the focus of this study, we will not hypothesize on the relationship 
2.3 Institutional framework and governance mechanisms  
Researchers stressed the importance influence of institutional framework towards organizations (e.g., 
Scott 1987, North 1990). According to North (1990), the institutional framework is made up of both 
formal and informal constraints around individual and organizational behavior. Formal constraints 
include political (and judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts. Informal constraints, on the other 
hand, include codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and convention. Studies find in situations where 
formal constraints fail, informal constraints will come into play (e.g., Scott 1987).  
Researchers point out that firms are embedded in institutional contexts and may not have the same 
values for all firms. A hallmark of transition economies is the coexistence of state-owned and non-
state-owned firms, which differ in their behaviors and performance (e.g., Peng and Luo 2000). 
Researchers propose two kinds of relationship ties, namely relationships with government and 
relationship with other firms (Peng and Luo 2000). They advocate that SOEs and non-SOEs have 
different initial relationships and thus their incentives to further build the relationship is different 
(Table 1). SOEs naturally have legitimacy and receive support or even protection from the government 
agencies that have founded them. In contrast, non-SOEs initially suffer from a lack of legitimacy as 
new organizations (Aldrich and Fiol 1994), and they are in a relatively weak position in the 
institutional environment (Nee 1992). Thus, top executives at non-SOEs may have a stronger urge to 
improve their relationship to compensate for their liability of newness.   
 
  
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
Incentives to build the relationships 
with  government officials  Low High 
Informal 
Constraints 
Incentives to build the relationships 
with other firms  Medium High 
Level of institutional support  Strong Weak Formal 
Constraints  Confidence on formal contracts Strong Low 
Table 1. Institutional Influences on SOEs and Non-SOEs (Adopted from Peng and Luo 2000)  
As contractual governance relies on the legitimacy to take effect, non-SOEs will not expect too much 
on the contracts to provide protection. Managers in these firms have more incentives to build 
relationships as a substitute for their weak institutional support (e.g., Xin and Pearce 1996). SOEs 
firms have easier access to government support, and they will have more confidence on the formal 
contracts. We propose that:  
H1: The positive relationship between contractual governance and outsourcing success will be 
stronger in SOEs than in non-SOEs. 
H2: The positive relationship between relational governance and outsourcing success will be 
stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs. 
We expect the same pattern will occur between governance mechanisms and relational continuity. 
According to above analysis, formal contracts specify the role and obligations of both parties, which 
could be served as a basis for future collaboration. We also learn that SOEs, compared to non-SOEs, 
have advantages in fulfilling the effectiveness of formal contracts. The advantages may lead to higher 
future collaboration expectation. Similarly, non-SOEs have more incentives to seek relational 
mechanisms to counteract the weak formal constraints in the institutional environment, which will lead 
them to higher relational continuity expectation. Therefore, we propose that:  
H3: The positive relationship between contractual governance and relational continuity will be 
stronger in SOEs than in non-SOEs. 
H4: The positive relationship between relational governance and relational continuity will be 
stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs. 
We predict that the relationship between outsourcing success and relational continuity expectation will 
also be different according to the ownership types. Non-SOEs are found to have strong incentives to 
improve interpersonal connections to compensate for their liability of newness. Top managers at these 
firms may have a strong urge to search for better performance, and their incentive structures tend to 
link with performance better. They may not easily give up a cooperative relationship, especially a 
successful one. On the other hand, top executives at SOEs, which may still likely to be appointed by 
the state, may be less constrained by budgets, and their incentive structures are not directly aligned 
with performance (e.g., Peng and Luo 1998). Therefore, we proposed that the performance driven 
attitude of non-SOEs will lead to a stronger relationship between outsourcing success and relational 
continuity than the SOEs.  
H5: The positive relationship between outsourcing success and relational continuity will be 
stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs. 
2.4 Control variables  
We examined several control variables that could influence outsourcing success and relational 
continuity expectation. Two project characteristics that are often thought to influence outsourcing 
success, project type and project size was controlled. We also controlled three firm level 
characteristics that may affect relational continuity expectation: relationship age, firm size and 
industry.  
  
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Research Design  
A survey method was chosen for this study to allow for easy replication and for the findings to be 
reconfirmed or disconfirmed. One questionnaire was designed for data collection. IS outsourcing 
project was used as the unit of analysis in this study. Followed previous studies in IS and strategic 
management studies (e.g., Koh and Ang and Straub 2004, Popper and Zenger 2002), participants in 
this study are required to be the top IT executives. Only in situations where multiple projects from a 
client firm were surveyed, project managers were assigned by top IT executives to fill in the 
questionnaires. If this is the case, we also asked top IT executives to make sure that no two projects 
are with the same vendor.  
Due to the difficulty of deriving probability samples of that are representative for all of China (Roy et 
al. 2001), we collected data in three areas: Shandong Province, Sichuan Province and Shanghai. We 
collaborated with three universities in the three areas for data collection.  Colleagues and students in 
the three universities helped to distribute questionnaires to the local firms with IS outsourcing 
experiences. Around 150 questionnaires are distributed in each area. 178 questionnaires are collected, 
the response rate is around 39.6%. Among them, 126 are usable. The 126 outsourcing projects are 
from 109 firms. The demography of the sample is shown in Table 2. Industry and firm size are based 
on firms, relationship age and project amount are based on outsourcing projects. There are 60 SOEs 
(72 projects) and 49 non-SOEs (54 projects).  
 
Industry Percentage Relationship Age (months) Percentage 
Banking  3.2 <12 19.0 
Manufacturing 19.8 12-24 19.8 
Service 40.4 24-60 49.2 
Others 36.5 >60 11.9 
Firm Size 
(Employees) Percentage 
AMOUNT 
(1000 US$) 
Percentage 
<100 13.5 <10 62.8 
100-500 42.1 10-100 31.9 
500-1000 12.7 >100 5.3 
>1000 31.7   
Table 2.  Demography data of the sample 
One of the potential sources of bias that needs to be properly addressed in survey studies is non-
response bias (Fowler 1993). Early and late respondents were compared to evaluate this potential bias. 
Early respondents were defined as those who had completed and returned the questionnaire within the 
initial three-week period, while late respondents were defined as those who returned the questionnaire 
after this period. Around 49.2% (62 out of 126) of the responses were from early respondents. Four 
demographic characteristics (number of employees, firm ownership property, and relationship age and 
project amount) were used to verify the non-response bias. No significant differences were found at 
the 1% level. Therefore, it was decided that non-response bias would not be a problem.  
3.2 Measures  
Multi-item scales were used to operationalize the variables except for the control variables. We 
obtained these items largely from past research, fine tuning some of them to suit this study’s context. 
All perceptual items were measured by seven-point Likert scales ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to 
‘strongly agree’. Sample measurements and the references of our main constructs are listed in Table 3.  
  
 
Constructs Items Sample Measurements Reference 
Contractual 
Governance 
3 Our relationship with the vendor is governed primarily by rules and 
regulations of contracts.  
We have formal agreements that detail the obligations of both parties.  
We would find satisfactory solution to disagreement, whether it is 
based on agreement or not. (R)a 
Cannon et al. 
(2000); 
Ferguson et al. 
(2005). 
Relational  
Governance 
3 We have an extremely collaborative relationship with the vendor.  
We share long- and short-term goals and plans with the vendor.   
We can rely on the vendor to keep promises.  
(Poppo and 
Zenger 2002). 
 
Outsourcing 
Success 
9 We have 
…been able to refocus on core business.  
…enhanced economies of scale in human resources. 
... reduced the risk of technological obsolescence. 
Grover et al. 
(1996); Lee 
and Kim 
(1999). 
Expectation 
of 
Relational 
Continuity 
3 Our relationship with the vendor will last far into future.  
We and the vendor expect to continue working with each other on a 
long-term basis.  
We and the vendor would welcome the possibility of additional 
collaboration in the future. 
Jap (2001); 
Jap and 
Anderson 
(2003).  
a (R) Item is reversely coded.  
Table 3.  Constructs Measurements.  
All five control variables use single-item measures. Followed Koh et al. (2004), only two types of 
outsourcing project were classified (0=non-systems-development projects, 1= systems-development 
projects). Project size was measured by the contract amount. Relationship age was measured by the 
number of months that the exchanging parties have been collaborated. The number of employees was 
used as the measure of firm size. Industry was measure using categories from 1-5 (1= Banking, 2= 
Manufacturing, 3= Service, 4= others).  
4 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
Because of our sample size and the number of parameters estimated, we use procedures recommended 
by Gainey and Klaas (2003) to reduce the number of parameters in our overall measurement model. 
Since outsourcing success has nine indicators, we followed Williams and Anderson (1994) and created 
single-item indicators for the three aspects (strategic, economic and technological benefits) of 
outsourcing success. This process allowed us to use all of the survey items in each measure, but to also 
restrict the indicator variables to a reasonable number.  
We used partial least squares (PLS) to analyze the data. Frequently used in MIS research, PLS uses a 
nonparametric approach to evaluate relationships within, and variance explained by, a structural 
equation model (e.g., Gefen and Straub and Marie-Claude 2000). PLS is particularly useful for our 
study because it is robust to relatively small sample sizes and non-normal distribution of the data 
(Chin 1998). 
Since all data were perceptual and collected from a single source at the same time, we realized that 
common method bias might be a threat to the validity of our research. To test the possible common 
method bias, we used the Harman's one-factor test on the questionnaire measurement items (Podsakoff 
and Organ 1986). The resulting principal components factor analysis yielded multiple factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and the first factor accounts for 30.9% the total variance. We also 
followed the recommendation of Padsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff (2003) and the procedure 
used by Liang, Saraf, Hu and Xin (2007), we added a common method factor to the PLS model. The 
indicators of all constructs were associated reflectively with method factor. Then, we calculated each 
indicator’s variance explained by the principle constructs and by the method factor. The results 
demonstrate that the average substantively explained variance for the indicators is 0.64, while the 
  
common method variance is only 0.027. The above evidence suggests that the common method bias is 
not a significant issue in this study.  
4.1 The measurement model  
The measurement model was assessed separately for each subgroup. All constructs in the model of 
two groups satisfied requirements for reliability (composite reliability greater than .70) and 
discriminant validity (average variance extracted greater than .50). We also examined the discriminant 
and convergent validity of each indicator (Chin 1998). In Table 4, the diagonal elements represent the 
square root of AVE, providing a measure of the variance shared between a construct and its indicators. 
A rule for assessing discriminant validity requires that the square root of AVE be larger than the 
correlations between constructs; that is, the off-diagonal elements (Barclay and Thompson and 
Higgins 1995). All constructs in the current study also met the requirements. Thus, the constructs in 
the model displayed adequate discriminant validity.  
 
Subgourp and Construct Composite 
Reliability 
Correlations of Constructsa 
SOEs  1 2 3 4 
1. Contractual Governance 0.885 0.849    
2. Relational Governance 0.939 0.569 0.914   
3. Outsourcing Successb 0.923 0.594 0.655 0.866  
4. Relational Continuity Expectation 0.931 0.568 0.723 0.542 0.933 
Non-SOEs  1 2 3 4 
1. Contractual Governance 0.903 0.870    
2. Relational Governance 0.901 0.574 0.867   
3. Outsourcing Successb 0.922 0.41 0.701 0.865  
4. Relational Continuity Expectation 0.935 0.562 0.681 0.699 0.936 
a Diagonal elements in the “correlation of constructs” matrix are the square root of AVE.  
bFor measurements of outsourcing success, the three-item scale after indicator reduction procedures was used.   
Table 4. Composite Reliability, Inter-correlations and AVEs.  
 
Further, there were several inter-construct correlations in Table 4 that were over the 0.60 criteria. This 
indicated that multicollinearity may be a potential problem for this research. Generally, the common 
rule of thumb for the presence of multicollinearity is that variance inflation factors (VIFs) are higher 
than 10 or Tolerance values are less than 0.1 (Mason and Perreault 1991). Our results show that the 
highest VIF was 1.87, and that the lowest tolerance value was 0.58. Thus, multicollinearity did not 
appear to be a significant problem for our dataset.  
4.2 The structural model  
The structural models were tested for both SOE and non-SOE groups. Bootstrap analyses were 
performed with 500 subsamples, with sample sizes set equal to the sample sizes (n=72/n=54). Figure 1 
shows the standardized path coefficients and the explained constructs variances. To test our hypothesis 
associated with different ownership firms, we compared the coefficients of individual paths between 
the two structural models. It is necessary to first assess whether the latent variables were perceived in a 
similar fashion between SOE and Non-SOE groups (Carte and Ressel 2003). We applied multigroup 
measurement invariance analysis (e.g., Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998).  
We performed configural and metric invariance analyses to evaluate the measurement invariance 
across SOE and Non-SOE groups using AMOS 7.0. Due to our sample size and model complexity 
  
constraints, we used the three indicator measurements for the constructs of outsourcing success. 
Configural invariance analysis revealed the pattern of item loadings to be congeneric across the two 
groups. The change in CFI between two nested (configural and metric) models is 0.007, which is 
below than the threshold of 0.01(Cheung and Rensvold 2002), providing support for the metric 
invariance. In sum, the measurement invariance is supported in our study.  
Thus, hypotheses on the group differences (H1-H5) could be tested by statistically comparing 
corresponding path coefficients in the structural models. This comparison was carried out followed 
Chin et al. (1996) and Keil et al. (2000)’s procedure+. T-statistics was calculated to evaluate the 
differences in path coefficients across models.  
Results show that the effectiveness of governance mechanisms on outsourcing success and relational 
outcome are significantly different among SOE and non-SOEs firms in three out of the five 
comparisons, three out of the five hypotheses are supported (Table 5). Contractual governance is 
significantly related to outsourcing success in SOEs, while in non-SOEs the relationship is 
nonsignificant. The result confirms the Hypothesis 1, indicating SOEs have more confidence in the 
formal contracts than non-SOEs. Relational governance is significantly linked to outsourcing success 
in both groups, even though the non-SOEs group has stronger impact. The difference is marginally 
significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is supported.  
Both governance mechanisms have significant relationships with relational continuity in both SOEs 
and non-SOEs. Contrary to our expected, the relationships between the two mechanisms and relational 
continuity are not influenced by the firm ownership types. Thus, Hypothesis 3 and 4 are not supported.  
We found that outsourcing success will lead to expectation of future collaboration in non-SOEs but 
not in SOEs. The results identify a significant different relationship between outsourcing success and 
relational continuity in SOE and non-SOE groups, indicating the support of Hypothesis 5.  
We also found two significant control variables in non-SOE groups. Project type is significantly 
related to outsourcing success, and industry is significantly linked to relational continuity. While in 
SOE group, relationship age is found to relate to relational continuity.  Non-significant control 
variables (project size and firm size) are not shown in Figure 1.  
 
Hypothesis and Path SOEs Non-SOEs T-stat Hypothesis Supported or 
Not 
H1: CG → OS 0.358(0.102)* 0.004(0.097) N.S. 2.192* Supported 
H2: RG → OS 0.458(0.113)*** 0.711(0.108)*** - 1.598+ Supported 
H3: CG → RC 0.179(0.115)* 0.273(0.132) * - 0.540 (N.S.) Not Supported 
H4: RG → RC 0.609(0.100)*** 0.601(0.112)*** 0.053 (N.S.) Not Supported 
H5: OS → RC 0.007(0.186)N.S. 0.522(0.115) *** -2.189 Supported 
Path coefficient is significant at: +p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; N.S.: Path coefficient (or comparison ) is not 
significant.  
a. CG=contractual governance; RG=relational governance; OS=outsourcing success; RC=relational continuity.  
b. One-tailed tests were performed as the direction difference was hypothesized.  
Table 5. Path Comparison.  
 
                                                        
+
 The equation is : t= (PC1 – PC2) / {sqrt [(N1 – 1) / (N1 + N2 +2) · SE12 + (N2 – 1) / (N1 + N2 +2)· SE22 ] ·sqrt(1/N1+ 
1/N2)}, where  T = t-statistic with N1 + N2 +2 degrees of freedom, Ni = sample size of dataset for SOE or Non-SOE group, 
SEi = standard error of path in structural model for SOE or Non-SOE group, PCi = path coefficient in structural model for 
SOE or Non-SOE group.  
  
Figure 1. The structural model 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary  
This study confirms the import influence of institutional contexts on the firm behaviour. It is shown 
that the effectiveness of governance mechanisms on outsourcing success will change with the type of 
the ownership. SOEs firms, which are closely connected with government, have relatively more 
institutional support and confidences in the contracts they signed. On the other hand, non-SOEs have 
to rely on relational governance as a substitute for the weak institutional supports.  
The contingent relationship between outsourcing success and relational continuity expectation can also 
be attributed to the characteristics of transition economies. We found that the success of outsourcing 
projects in non-SOEs will lead to a better chance of future collaboration than that of SOEs. The results 
are consistent with previous studies that non-SOEs are more performance driven than SOEs. Another 
plausible reason could be that SOEs, as the more established firms, may have more collaborative 
relationships than the non-SOEs, which may reduce their dependence on current relationships.  
On the contrary, the relationships between the two mechanisms and relational continuity are not 
influenced by the firm ownership types. There will be several possible explanations. Firstly, it may 
because that the expectation of future continuity is not a performance outcome. This may indicate that 
the influence of institutional contexts may be more salient in moderating the relationships with firm 
performance or behaviour. Secondly, it may because the effectiveness of the governance mechanisms 
on performance is different with that on expectation. For example, the contract has no effect on the 
non-SOEs’ outsourcing outcome, but significantly influence their expectation, this reduce the 
differences between the SOEs and non-SOEs.  
5.2 Implications for theory and practice  
The findings of this study have several contributions to our knowledge of governance mechanisms in 
outsourcing relationships in transition economies.  
T.
T.
Contractual
Governance
Outsourcing
Success
(R2=0.520)
R2=0.547
Relational
Continuity
Expectation
Relational
Governance
N.S.
0.522***
0.358***
N.S.
Project
Type
0.458***
0.711***
N.S.
0.128+
Path coefficient for the Non-SOEs
Path coefficient for the SOEs
+        P<0.10
*        P<0.05
**       P<0.01
***      P<0.001
(R2=0.609)
Relationship Age
0.129*
N.S.
R2=0.678
Industry
N.S.
-0.183*
0.179*
0.273*
0.609***
0.601***
Total effect between governance mechanisms
and relational continuity expectation.T.
  
Firstly, while governance mechanisms’ role in client-vendor relationships has long been highlighted in 
the literature, most previous studies have focused on firms in the western countries with mature market 
economies. Literature fails to provide evidence on how to govern the outsourcing relationships in 
transition economies. This study contributes to this line of research by empirically demonstrate how 
and under what conditions the governance mechanisms are linked with the outsourcing success and the 
relational continuity. The findings are in line with previous studies that stress both the mechanisms are 
important in enhancing the relationship performance and the commitment.  
Secondly, the findings can contribute to the literature on firms in transition economies. So far, most 
studies in this area have focused on managerial ties (e.g., Xin and Pearce 1996) or political networking 
(Li and Zhang 2007), which are on the perspective of informal constrains. However, we have adopted 
a boarder view by examining both formal and informal constraints in transition economies in this 
study. It is found that the type of the firm ownership will be a moderator of the effectiveness of the 
contractual governance which is a kind of formal constraints. This study may provide evidences on the 
solidness and completeness of institutional theory.  
Thirdly, the findings of the present study provide evidences on explaining the controversial 
observations of the effects of governance mechanisms. For example, previous studies have 
controversial conclusion on the mechanisms of contractual governance towards relationship 
performance. Some researchers proposed that formal contracts are rather unimportant in the exchange 
agreements (Larson 1992) or even ‘get in the way of creating good exchange relationships between 
business units.’ (Macaulay 1963: 64). While others held that a well negotiated contract can reduce risk 
and uncertainty and serve as a foundation for a successful relationship (e.g., Cannon et al. 2000). One 
possible explanation could lie in the various contingency contexts: researches which identify the 
effectiveness of formal contracts on opportunism and relational outcome could be different with the 
change of uncertainty (Carson and Madhok and Wu 2006), and the legal environment hostility 
(Cavusgil  and Deligonul and Zhang 2004). The study added to the literature by indicating that the 
types of ownership could also be a contingency variable that moderates the relationship between 
governance mechanisms and outsourcing performance.  
Finally, this study extends previous knowledge of success on a continued basis by examining 
outsourcing relationship in the transition economies. The study shows that the success of current 
projects will not always lead to the continuity of future relationship. Previous studies argued that 
loyalty is caused by a combination of satisfaction and switching barriers. This study identifies that 
there may be other factors that can affect the future relational continuity. The study finds that for firms 
that are not performance driven, the success of current projects may not necessarily lead to future 
collaboration.  
The study has also provided implications for practice. It is confirmed in this study that both 
contractual and relational governance are important mechanisms for enhancing success and future 
collaboration. Managers should pay attention to both mechanisms to achieve success and develop 
cooperative relationships. The Study suggested that SOEs may have different relationship 
management strategies compared to non-SOEs. It has been pointed out that when cooperate with 
SOEs, IT vendors should be aware that only maintaining Guan Xi is not enough. Standardized and 
formal procedures will be necessary. On the other hand, for non-SOEs, contractual governance should 
be neglected. Since even it is not effective on enhancing project performance, it will be beneficial to 
future relationship development. Last but not least, in the transition economies, relationship is always 
important for all firms.  
6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study has several limitations: (1) as a group comparison study, the sample size of this study was 
small. Due to the difficulty of data collection in China, only three areas were chosen in the sample 
framework. Future studies that incorporate a broader and larger sampling frame may provide 
  
additional validity and empirical support for the theoretical studies in this area. (2) Relational 
continuity expectation is not a performance outcome, and the study is cross sectional. This limitation 
determinates that we could not explain if the governance mechanisms will have different impacts on 
the short-term and the long-term outcomes, which can be an interesting research topic. Future research 
which adopts long-term relationship performance of longitudinal studies will be beneficial.  
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